Why Young Men and Women Are Heading in Opposite Political Directions

In most democracies, the chasm between the political attitudes of young men and women is rapidly widening. In the past, young voters were more or less united in their liberal-centrist worldview. But now, it seems that this demographic is becoming increasingly divided along the axis of sex, and this division may reveal troubling issues buried in today’s society.

Two decades ago, there was little difference between men and women aged 18-29 on a self-reported scale from 1 (very liberal) to 10 (very conservative). However, an analysis by The Economist found that by 2020, the gap was as large as 0.75 (see figure 1). In fact, a gap was present in all countries examined, with women consistently identifying as more liberal than their conservative counterparts (see Figure 2).

Figure 1: A graph illustrating the growing divide between the political attitudes of young men and women, based on data from 20 rich countries, (Photo Credit: The Economist.)

Figure 2: A graph illustrating the gap on the political spectrum between young men and women in 9 democratic countries, (Photo Credit: The Economist.)

Put simply, in the majority of established democracies, young women are swerving left, while young men swerve right. This gap in worldviews has already become visible in voting patterns in recent elections. In the 2024 US presidential elections, young men and women diverged dramatically, with Trump securing a landslide victory among men under thirty, and Harris mirroring these results among women in the same age group. In 2016, 51% of young men identified with or leaned toward the Democratic party, but by 2023, this figure was down to 39%. CEO of the Public Religion Research Institute, Melissa Deckman, has termed this a “historic reverse gender gap”.

This dynamic becomes even more complex upon an analysis of voting patterns in multi-party, rather than explicitly bipolar party systems. At the 2024 general election in the UK, Labour remained the most popular choice among young Brits. However, almost twice as many young women voted for the left-wing Green Party than young men (23% to 12%). Conversely, young men were more likely to vote for the right-wing populist Reform UK (12% to 6%) and the Conservative Party than young women. An even more exaggerated version of this pattern emerged in the 2025 Polish presidential elections. In the first round of the elections, Sławomir Mentzen of the far-right conservative Confederation party won a staggering victory among men aged 18-29, obtaining an astonishing 47.6 percent. It is worth noting that Mentzen has expressed fringe nationalist and conservative views, famously declaring, “We don’t want Jews, homosexuals, abortion, taxes or the European Union." Victory among young women went to Adrian Zandberg (24.9 percent), a social democrat and proud supporter of free healthcare, affordable housing, and gender equality. 

Thus, an examination of electoral behavior in multi-party systems unearths another layer of the political gulf between young men and women – not only are they diverging from each other, but they are also distancing themselves from mainstream, centrist parties. Disappointed with the lukewarm policies of established movements, the youth is gravitating towards more radical options, and simultaneously becoming separated from the opposing sex.

Causes of the chasm

What has driven this divide among younger generations? One explanation arises from the growing education gap. In recent decades, women have outpaced men in educational attainment in most developed nations. Most significantly, women show higher rates of university enrollment and graduation (see Figure 3). In fact, women are overrepresented among Jagiellonian University students, constituting 64,87% of the student body. The correlation between higher education and liberal political views is widely documented, largely explaining the political gender chasm.

Figure 3: A graph illustrating the higher education gap between men and women in OECD countries, (Photo Credit: The Economist.)

Another reason for the growing gulf between the politics of young men and women is the rise of postfeminism: the view that most or all the goals of the feminist movement have been achieved and that the movement has no further purpose. Since the first wave of the women’s movement, many of its aims have been accomplished in Western Society: the right to vote, greater access to education, more equitable pay, and reproductive rights, just to name a few. Thus, the emergence of the fourth wave of feminism in the 2010s was seen by some as superfluous, the fight for a broader dismantling of patriarchy unnecessary, in light of these basic goals having been satisfied. The attack on rape culture, toxic masculinity, and trans exclusion was regarded as emblematic of the subversive ‘woke’ movement of the 2010s. Accordingly, alongside the ‘anti-woke’ movement of the 2020s, postfeminism has emerged as a backlash against the advancements made in the realm of women’s rights.

Gen Z men are dramatically less likely to identify as feminist than their Millennial counterparts, illustrating the effect of this recent backlash on men’s support for the movement. Many feel that “feminism has gone too far”, and are consequently drawn to support populist, far-right parties who more often express support for traditional gender roles, King’s College professor Rosie Campbell told BBC. Research supports the idea that young men’s sympathy towards conservative movements constitutes a negative reaction to feminist movements. One study found that modern youth gender gaps tend to be greater in countries with greater gender equality, and another concluded that young European men are especially likely to resent women (and feel that feminism is unnecessary) if unemployment has recently risen in their area. Perhaps young men’s attraction to right-wing movements reflects a perceived threat posed by women’s advancements. As women break the glass ceiling, men fight to protect themselves from the shards.

Many commentators hypothesize that social media echo chambers (online environments in which a person is exposed only to beliefs or opinions that confirm and reinforce their own) serve to exacerbate the political divide between men and women. These are bolstered by filter bubbles, where algorithmic curation pushes specific types of content to certain demographic groups. 

The aforementioned resentment and perceived status loss among some young men is further amplified by misinformation and anti-feminist rhetoric that circulates rapidly in online spaces. 

One growing corner of the digital world is the “manosphere”: a loose network of communities that claim to address men’s struggles – dating, fitness, or finances, for example – but often promote harmful advice and attitudes. This collection of content is united by its anti-feminist, traditionalist orientation and significant overlap with far-right ideology. In a world where digital spaces have become central to how we learn and connect, creators such as Jordan Peterson, Adin Ross, Sneako, and Fresh & Fit sell young men a package deal of masculinity, complete with far-right traditionalist ideals.

A TikTok clip from the popular ‘manosphere’ podcast Fresh & Fit. The creator pictured says,  “Women are the inferior gender and we need to step up and be leaders in every way.”, (Photo Credit: Fresh & Fit Podcast on TikTok.)

A post by an X user in response to a woman sharing her graduation photos. (Photo Credit: @_africa_1 on X.)

Some point out that similar online environments exist for women. Misandry, the dislike of or contempt for men, is a popular concept circulating on social media posts directed towards women. It is important to note, however, that misandrist content has a substantially more sarcastic and reactive tone, and that there is no recognition of a broader “womanosphere” online ecosystem where these views are shared within communities along with left-wing ideas. Nevertheless, this type of content still serves to antagonize the opposite sex, driving differences between Gen Z men and women further.

Examples of misandrist content online. (Photo Credits: @username13153 and @cherrylimeade67 on TikTok.)

Whatever the reason for these gender differences, it is undeniable that they are ultimately being exploited by political elites. Commentators across the political spectrum agree that right-wing party members are simply better at appealing to young men than left-wing ones are. The Republicans’ strategy during the 2024 elections was successful because it addressed young American men directly. During his campaign, Trump attended Ultimate Fighting Championship bouts, walking out to Kid Rock’s ‘American Badass’ and taking part in an interview and livestream with Adin Ross. President of the American Institute for Boys and Men, Richard Reeves, argues that the Republicans ran and won on the sentiment that men’s problems are real, and that, for a long time, they have been neglected. At the same time, Harris failed to appeal to young male voters, choosing instead to focus largely on national abortion protections, LGBT+ rights, and climate change. Existing political differences between men and women are increasingly being weaponized by parties, and by recognizing the grievances of young men, the right appears to be gaining ground.

Implications: men as comrades, not enemies

The simple, and regrettably, common conclusion would be to frame young men as misogynistic patriarchal oppressors who support right-wing politicians in order to curtail women’s growing power in society. However, an approach that is more sensitive to men’s grievances offers a considerably less bleak interpretation. Richard Reeves summarises the political gender divide, saying: “This is less about young men being pulled towards the right than it is about them being pushed away from the left”. While the postfeminist backlash and ‘manosphere’ echo chambers undoubtedly intensify young men’s rightward shift, the resonance of right-wing parties with this group highlights its underlying causes. The majority of young men appear to simply be reacting to broader economic and social conditions that have left them trailing behind women for some time. Statistically, young men are more likely to experience depression, lower educational attainment, and weaker financial prospects than their female counterparts, and many are consequently searching for political solutions.

Thus, the answer is not to push young men further into a corner of political correctness, but to engage with men’s struggles and include them in political programs, not just on the right of the spectrum. In her essay “Men: Comrades in Struggle”, bell hooks argues that “feminist advocates collude in the pain of men wounded by patriarchy when they falsely represent men as always and only powerful, as always and only gaining privileges from their blind obedience to patriarchy.” Thus, she challenges any rhetoric that frames women as the sole victims of patriarchy, and suggests that men’s experiences of systemic pressures should also be acknowledged and addressed. Perhaps it is time to join forces with young men rather than drive our divisions further.

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