Changes of Warfare in Ukraine

Ian Thompson
May 13
18 min read

When Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, most governments and military analysts expected a quick Russian victory within a few days due to large numbers of Russian military equipment in service and in Soviet era military stockpiles, but also due to overrated Russian military skills that existed through the image of a large unstoppable Russian army. To be taken into account is an underestimation of Ukraine’s military abilities and the will of the Ukrainian people to face their invaders. Ukraine not only stopped Russian advances toward Kyiv and other directions, but also drove Russian forces out of several Oblasts back into the Donbass area in the East. However, since the start of the war, both sides went through fundamental changes in personnel, equipment and combat operation conduct, changing the idea of modern warfare conduction.

*Front line development in Ukraine (Photo credit: Al Jazeera)*

Putin launched his invasion at 5.07 a.m. with around 200.000 soldiers, thousands of tanks and armored vehicles and hundreds of aircraft and helicopters. The goal of the attack was to replace the pro-Western government of Zelensky with a puppet regime in Kyiv to strengthen Russian influence in Ukraine as a former nation of the USSR for pushing NATO’s influence out of Eastern Europe. However, what was intended to be an operation of a few days turned out to be a meatgrinder for both sides in the past four years. Right now, Russia and Ukraine are not in the condition to gain momentum on the battlefield to achieve an operational breakthrough to decide the outcome of the war. According to the “Associated Press”, Moscow occupies 19.4% of Ukrainian territory with only 0.79% captured in 2025 at the cost of an estimated 418.000 men. After that disastrous year, the meat grinder did not come to an end, it continues with no end in sight.

Both armies, the Ukrainian and Russian armed forces, are going through transformations and are not recognizable from their capabilities at the beginning of the war. Not only that, but also both economies were transformed from a peace-time economy to a war-time economy. To analyze the changes in warfare, multiple components need to be considered: Number of existing equipment, economic changes, technological advances, changes in leading personnel, number of active personnel, and tactical changes.

Russia’s culture in publishing military output is limited. Rosstat, the Russian Federal Service of State Statistics but also the Russian ministry of Defence only release limited information of numbers in military production. According to Julian Cooper, production increased for SU-35S, SU-34 and SU-57 for aircraft, and for helicopters production for the models of Mi-28NM and Ka-52/52M increased. Drone production increased as well, especially for Orlan reconnaissance drones and Lancet loitering munition drones. Drones nevertheless became the symbol of the full scale war as millions are in use on both sides. However, Russia also receives aid in drone deliveries from other countries, especially from Iran. Shaheds now are not just being delivered by Tehran, but also built in a production plant in Tartastan where they got the new name of “Geran”. Those drones are not just used to attack military targets, they also target civilian and residential targets like churches in Lviv on March 24, 2026, and residential areas daily. Moscow’s surface ship programmes immediately stopped when the war started because the engines for those ships were delivered by Ukrainian enterprises. In terms of tanks, armored vehicles (BTRs and BMPs), and artillery, Russia mostly modernizes and repairs armor from old Soviet stockpiles like the T-72, T-80, T-54, MT-LB, and BMP-3, but also new models are being built which have not been in stock piles like the T-14 Armata, Msta-B and D-20 howitzers, and the BTR-82A. Another important factor is the number of artillery shells Russian factories are producing. The Financial Times reports that in 2025, a total of 7 million shells of various calibers were produced plus imports from North Korea. During the war, the Russian arms industry also proved its abilities in innovation. Fiber optic FPV drones and new versions of the Geran drone like the Geran-5 pose immediate threats to Ukrainian infrastructure and military units.

*Russian Geran factory (Photo credit: East2West News)*

Since the start of the war in 2022, Kyiv received an enormous amount of military aid from Western countries, but the Ukrainian weapons industry also experienced a huge wave in wide production output, innovation, and international attention. In the beginning, Kyiv had to rely mostly on Western military aid as its own military industry was rather small and had to use its own Soviet era armour active in service or in USSR stockpiles. However, one of Ukraine’s advantages was that major former USSR production plants are located in modern Ukraine like Pivdenmash in Dnipro that are responsible for the construction of Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles, however, the extent of Ukraine’s reopening of old Soviet factories is questionable. The artillery production was rather unsophisticated. In 2022, Ukraine had only a few prototypes of the so-called Bohdana howitzer which also shelled Snake Island in June 2022 when it was still occupied by Russian forces. Nevertheless, during the four years of war, Ukraine created a strong and resisting defense industry with large output and advance in innovation and technology. According to the Ukrainian minister of strategic industries Smetanin, the capacity of Ukraine’s defense sector had a value of $35 billion in 2024, a huge increase to the $1 billion in 2022. Additionally, arms production in 2024 had a value of $10 billion with an increase to $30-35 billion in 2025 as the Ukrainian Council of Defense Industry states. Now, the defense sector which hosts 900 enterprises like Fire Point develops and produces various types of new weapon systems, with an estimated capacity for 8 million drones that could be produced annually. The Ukrainian defense industry not only encompasses drones, but also artillery and other armored vehicles. Zelensky has stated that Ukraine now produces 40 Bohdana howitzers monthly while news dropped in January 2026, that UkrArmoTech delivered over 400 armored vehicles to the armed forces in December 2025 alone.

Ukrainian Boghdana howitzers (Photo credit: Defense Express)

Ukraine however can not just rely on its own production itself. Western countries, especially from the EU and Northern America represent the main supporters of Ukraine in its fight against Russian aggression. Not only does it help Kyiv to defend itself, but also stands as a wake-up call for the West to ramp up its arms production and to prepare itself for a possible upcoming war against Russia, but against China as well. The U.S. provided a total of $188 billion in aid to Ukraine. Donald Trump, who stopped material aid to Ukraine nevertheless continued to provide intelligence aid. Systems the U.S. sent to Ukraine are for example: 10.000 Javelin anti-armour systems, 500 million rounds of small arms ammo, hundreds of 155mm and 105mm howitzer with around 3 million of shells, 300 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, 31 Abraham tanks and 1300 Stryker and M113 armoured personnel carriers, 40 HIMARS systems and 3 Patriot air defence batteries. Not to forget is the permit of the U.S. to its European allies to deliver F-16s to Ukraine. In Europe, Germany, France, Sweden, Poland, Finland, Italy, Denmark, Norway, and Great Britain are the biggest supporters of Ukraine. The EU’s total support value amounts to $194.9 billion, with $69.7 billion in support for the armed forces. Aid includes millions of artillery shells, dozens of tanks and armored fighting vehicles like Challenger 2, Leopard 2, Swedish CV9035 IFVs and air defense support like the delivery of Patriot and SAMP/T air defense systems. European defense giants like Rheinmetall, but also start-ups like Helsing are an important factor in strengthening Ukraine’s defence capabilities. Joint ventures like PK MIL SA, formed by Ponar Wadowice and the Kramatorsk Heavy Machine Tool Building Plant, are about to produce weapon systems both in Ukraine and abroad. Those systems include Boghdana howitzers that PK MIL SA will produce in Poland, and drones like the German-Ukrainian joint venture Quantum Frontline Industries.

During the ongoing war, tactics on the battlefield changed drastically. At the beginning, large groupings of Russian armored vehicles were observable. Now, millions of UAVs and UGVs are flooding the battlefield, reshaping the idea of modern warfare conduction on land, in the air, and on the seas. Moscow’s advantage is the high number of manpower and equipment. The Euromaidan Press reported that Russia launched its invasion with 13.841 IFVs and while the number of tanks is harder to estimate it was reported that Russia lost about 3.000 tanks in 2024 alone, which would enable it to estimate that Moscow attacked Ukraine with roughly the same number of tanks. The Ukrainian armed forces at that time counted 200.000 active personnel, today, the number is around 900.000. Putin’s mistake was to send an invasion force of too few numbers to capture an entire country. In the military direction, an invasion force needs to be at least three times larger than the defending force for an invasion to be successful. Ukrainians were highly motivated to defend their country with hundreds of thousands signing up for the armed forces, aiming to push Russian aggressors out of their country. In addition to regular soldiers, civilians also played their role in stopping the invaders. While Ukrainian soldiers responded to Russian armoured columns with Javelin anti-armour systems, unarmed civilians stood against Russian tanks with such an incident in Koryukivka and at other places, civilians prepared Molotov cocktails to prevent Russians from advancing. Among the invading Russian forces, bad logistical preparations, low morale, and the underestimation of Ukrainian resistance were widespread. Despite the chaotic first weeks of fighting, Ukrainian units managed to regroup and drive Russian forces out of the Kyiv area. Later, in April and May 2022, Al Jazeera reported that Ukrainian troops launched local counteroffensive operations, forcing Russians back by 40km North and East from the city of Kharkiv. In the following weeks, Kyiv prepared the necessary conditions to launch additional counteroffensives in Kharkiv and Kherson regions where HIMARS systems played a crucial role for the first time by destroying frontline logistics, command posts, and ammo warehouses. The Kharkiv counteroffensive, also called the “Balakliia offensive” started in September 2022 which resulted in Ukraine retaking 12,000 square kilometers, catching Russian forces off guard around Balakliia, Kupiansk, and Izium. Thanks to detailed operational planning, use of small armoured and mobile groups, the use of drones, and Russian failures in logistics and in preparing soldiers, the offensive operation ended in complete success. From October to November 2022, Kyiv also launched a counteroffensive in Kherson Oblast by destroying Russian logistical routes over the Dnipro river, forcing Moscow to retreat its soldiers from the west bank of Kherson, including Kherson City. Due to the high speed of Ukrainian movements, invading soldiers abandoned hundreds of armoured vehicles, including tanks and IFVs. After the successful counteroffensive, Ukraine, with Zaluzhnyi as the commander of the armed forces, continued to prepare for future counteroffensive operations in 2023. However, the long time of preparations enabled Russia to build defensive fortifications and deploy Ka-52 helicopters to the Zaporizhzhia direction. The 2023 counteroffensive was launched in the Bakhmut and Zaporizhzhia areas. Bakhmut was reported captured in May 2023; however, Ukrainian units like the 3rd Assault Brigade launched coordinated attacks at the flanks, recapturing some villages in the area. In Zaporizhzhia, the counteroffensive ended up in a strategic failure due to the Russian Ka-52 helicopters destroying Ukrainian mechanized attacks. The New York Times reports that 20% of vehicles deployed for counterattack operations were either destroyed or damaged with a high number of Western armour included. Since then, Ukraine has developed new tactics in warfare to prevent such high numbers of losses again. Its new tactic since then was a “bend but don’t break" strategy while focusing on inflicting as much damage to Russia as possible. In addition, Gen. Zaluzhnyi was replaced by Col. Gen. Syrskyi, who organized the defence of Kyiv. From now on, Russia regained the initiative on the battlefield, attacking with armoured mechanized assault groups and using large numbers of UMPK and UMBP glide bombs. Glide bombs played a crucial role in demolishing Ukrainian defences in the City of Avdiivka which has been occupied since early 2024. It wasn’t just Russian glide bombs that forced Ukraine to abandon the stronghold of Avdiivka, and to practice the strategy of bend but don’t break. Two main reasons have to be considered: Ukraine needs to save the life of its soldiers due to a smaller population and a sharp shortage of artillery shells, which was exploited by Russia. At the same time, drones started to appear in larger numbers on the battlefield, systems that would change warfare in Ukraine forever. First, drones already appeared at the beginning of the war. Turkish Bayraktar drones aided in preventing Russian armoured columns from reaching their targets. Compared to the massive use of drones that would come up in the following years, the scale of use in mass of the Bayraktar drone was relatively small. As the war progressed, Ukraine and Russia started to develop their own domestic drone industries. From now on, millions of drones have started to play an irreplaceable role in many different ways, such as the elimination of infantry and vehicles, drone offensives against Russian oil industries and Ukrainian civilian targets, the saving of lives of wounded soldiers, and the transportation of supplies. The impact of drones is noteworthy: Both parties had and still have to rethink their tactics constantly, and losses are rising significantly. While Russia exploited Ukraine’s shortage of artillery shells, Ukraine began to replace the role of artillery as the main source of losses with drones. When Moscow would start mechanized armored attacks, it would be immediately discovered by Ukrainian surveillance and reconnaissance drones, and eventually be destroyed by FPV drones like in the direction of Novomykhailivka village in early 2024. After some time, Moscow had to rethink its tactics in that matter. Not only did Russia lose armored vehicles faster than it can produce, but it is also not profitable when a tank worth millions of dollars is destroyed by a drone worth just a few hundred dollars.

*Ukrainian soldier posing with FPV drones (Photo credit: United 24)*

In terms of drones, various models and styles of warfare emerged. To start with Russia, its imported Shaheds, later known as Geran drones. According to Reuters, Russia produces 404 Geran drones daily, aiming to raise production up to 1000 per day. Those low-cost Geran-type drones are being used to attack civilian targets and infrastructure, let it be civilian or military infrastructure like power plants during the 2025/2026 winter period, to break the morale of the Ukrainian civil society. Geran drones are not the only type of weapons used in Russia’s air campaign. Iskander, Kinzhal, Oreshnik, and Kalibr missiles are used as well. Russia has largely increased its drone production capacities, producing 2 million FPV drones and 30.000 long range drones in 2025, The Kyiv Independent reports. During the air attacks, Russia also launches drones without explosive warheads to exhaust Ukrainian air defence which enables Shahed drones to pass air defences and reach their targets more easily. FPV drones have nevertheless been modified since GPS jamming became a common tool to intercept the signal between the drone pilot and the drone itself. Soon, FPV drones were modified into fiber-optic FPV drones. Those drones can not be intercepted by jamming because they are connected with the pilot via a cable. Kursk became the first place where fiber-optic drones were used for the first time when Ukraine launched its unexpected offensive into the region. The Atlantic Council states that due to the new technology, Ukrainian vehicle losses in Kursk were 25% higher than Russian losses. However, the disadvantages of fiber-optic drones are higher costs in production and a slower speed due to the cable. After the first emergence in Kursk, the new drones became part of drone warfare on all sections of the front on both sides. Just like with Kyiv, Moscow inflicts heavy casualties on Ukrainian frontline logistics and personnel, conducting deep strikes and halting attempted Ukrainian advances, using FPV drones and middle-range strike drones. An example that caused a shock in Ukrainian ranks was a failed Ukrainian counterattack in Toretsk in May 2025. The 100th separate brigade attempted to break through Russian defences and enter the city of Toretsk itself. As a result, three Bradelys, one Marder, and one M113 were lost together with the personnel included. Next to UAVs, Russia also introduced UGVs for frontline logistics, drones that are able to load dozens or hundreds of kilograms of supplies that can be transported to frontline positions, securing personnel who would have to do that assignment instead.

On Ukraine’s side, drones are in use in all kinds of environments, land, air, and sea. In the Black Sea, Ukrainian Uncrewed Surface Vessels (USVs) and underwater drones sank and damaged a significant part of the Russian Black Sea fleet, forcing it to the port of Novorossiysk. USVs were not only used against the Russian fleet. In June 2023, Ukrainian USVs hit the Kerch Bridge, Putin’s prestige Crimea project and Crimea’s lifeline. This signalled to Putin that Ukraine has the ability to reach targets Russia has considered as out of Kyiv’s range. 2023 marks the year Ukraine started ramping up its drone production. Euromaidan Press reports 800,000 drones produced in 2023, 2.2 million in 2024, 4 million in 2025, and 7 million planned for 2026. Those drones include USVs, UAVs, and UGVs. Kyiv switched from a doctrine where artillery would cause the majority to the doctrine of total drone warfare. Tactics now focused on reducing their own losses in personnel and equipment while inflicting irreplaceable casualties to Russia. During Moscow's slow but study advance in Donbass, Ukraine worked on expanding its strike capabilities in short-range, middle-range, and long-range capabilities. At the same time, Kyiv began to start bombing Russia’s key revenue industry. Pipelines, storage facilities, pumping stations, ports, and oil refineries have been hit for multiple years. Fabian Hoffmann writes in his report that this is only possible due to Ukrainian systematic strikes against Russian air defense systems, as one destroyed system often means the collapse of the air defense in an entire sector. Attacks on the Russian oil industry lead to the result that Russia needs to stop operations at hit refineries costing the Kremlin millions of dollars in revenues. This money can’t be spent on Putin’s war against Ukraine. Kyiv can already present complete success. Due to recent Ukrainian strikes against the export ports of Primorsk and Ust-Luga in late March, Moscow was forced to halt operations, leading to a drop of Russian oil exports by 43%. And the port of Novorossiysk can’t balance the exports because of recent attacks as well. Most weapons used against the oil industry are made in Ukraine, like jet-powered drones and FP-1 and FP-2 drones. Deep strikes include other weapons like the “Flamingo” cruise missile; however, the Flamingo’s use so far is limited because it needs to be optimized and one production line was destroyed in a Russian attack. The effects on the national economy are enormous. Russia’s growth in GDP lowered from 5% in 2024 to 1% in 2025. On the battlefield, UAVs and UGVs transformed Eastern Ukraine into a meat grinder for Russian soldiers. Both Russia and Ukraine founded their unmanned systems forces, with elite drone units serving in them like the “Magyar’s Birds” for Ukraine and “Rubicon” for Russia. FPV drones now represent the majority of casualty causes. For visualizing, Russia lost 35.351 soldiers in March 2026, 96% of them were caused by drones. Another symptom of expanded drone warfare now is that Russia loses soldiers faster than it can replace them with fresh recruits. In addition, Ukraine is systematically working on expanding the drone kill zone, which has already worked out well in the liberation of Kupiansk, where 27 Russian soldiers were killed for every soldier lost to Kyiv. UGVs are playing an important role as well, replacing soldiers for dangerous front tasks like logistics and even combat operations with Russian positions previously captured by Ukrainian UGVs for the first time. The higher number of FPV drone usages forced Russia to adopt the tactic of infiltrations, small groups of soldiers, often 2 to 4 men trying to find a way through enemy lines, in most cases with no survival rates which is also a factor of Moscow’s catastrophic losses in Ukraine, just to place some Russian flags in a village for propaganda purposes and to satisfy the higher command of the Russian armed forces, and Putin himself.

*Aftermath of an Ukrainian drone strike against Russian oil infrastructure (Photo credit: Alexander Bogomaz)*

Overall, tactics and technologies advanced rapidly in Ukraine. Both sides rely on the mass use of drones of all kinds, making it difficult for either side to gain momentum on the battlefield to achieve a decisive outcome. Ukraine’s military sector, the defense industry and the army demonstrated high resilience against Russia’s war of aggression, against an enemy which is supposed to have the second best army in the world. More importantly, Russia needs to drastically rethink its strategies used in Ukraine. The high losses in air defense systems will force Moscow to choose what it prioritizes to defend. Frontline regions or strategic industries in Russia, a dilemma nonetheless. A second dilemma is about the high losses of personnel Russia can’t compensate for anymore. If it would announce a second wave of mobilization, Russia would face an even worse situation of lack of personnel, as more young and skilled people would flee the country like in late 2022. This would also affect the St. Petersburg and Moscow regions themselves, bringing the everyday life of war fully to the two metropole populations forming the middle class of Russia with high support for Putin’s war. Ukraine, on the other hand, needs to work on expanding the influence of drones even more which would end up in two ways: Ukraine wouldn’t have to recruit as many soldiers as it does now when more combat operations and logistical works would be conducted by more drones which would enable Ukraine to have a much larger reserve for recruitment if another mobilization is needed, and considering the current situation even more important, a larger workforce keeping the economy running. The second path is the infliction of such high losses to Russian forces to make a lack of soldiers occur amongst Russian ranks. As a result of that, Kyiv could start preparations of a new larger counteroffensive ending not just in tactical, but also in operational success. How far this is from happening in the current situation on the front is debatable, but all the developments on the front and behind it, especially with Russia’s struggling economy, could eventually bring drastic future changes in the next months of the war.