China’s Silent Grip: How Beijing Fuels Myanmar’s Conflict to Secure Power and Profit

Myanmar is a country that has been beset by years of military conflict having lived through military rule from 1962 to 2011. As a pariah state, it was sanctioned by the international community, however, the nation began to liberalize and move to democracy. A nominally civilian government was established in 2011 after elections — it was the National League for Democracy (NLD). This was the opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi who won the election by a landslide, which is widely considered by international observers to be free and fair. Despite this, the military still managed to retain power. This came to a boiling point in 2021. A civil war started after a coup where military officers stepped up to power. Peaceful protests were met with aggression by the military, such as, firing live ammunition to civilians. Today, the military only maintains control over 21% of territory. Through this process, China has exerted significant external power in shaping Myanmar’s political world, as well as the course of the conflict.

Through this article, China as a global power; along with its self-interested foreign policy strategy of putting Myanmar in a position of perpetual chaos and disorder in order to gain financial and security advantage for China; analyzing the factors which define their way of action towards conflict; and the implications that go with these will be discussed. 

Beijing has started off by trying to cultivate a public image of non-interference when it comes to Myanmar’s internal affairs. China wanted to project itself as a ‘peaceful rising power’(Ding S., 2010) and advocated for a Myanmar-led and Myanmar-owned peace process, as well as being in support of the ASEAN Five-point consensus, which is a 2021 peace plan agreed upon by Southeast Asian leaders and Myanmar's military junta to address the violent post-coup crisis in Myanmar. However, its actions say otherwise. Western security analysts, in particular those from America, have pointed out that Myanmar is part of China’s ‘string of pearls’ strategy in the Indo-Pacific region, while economically, China has developed a strong interest in securing Myanmar’s abundant natural resources.

In 2019, 85-95% of global heavy rare earth supplies came from Myanmar, but were sourced by China. Initially, China chose to maintain restraint in its interference. When the coup did take place in 2021, China took a quiet stance based on its policy of non-interference in other countries’ internal affairs (Yoshikawa, 2022). In April 2021, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi stated that China supports ASEAN mediation efforts and believes that, "the international community should create a good environment for Myanmar's internal politics based on the principle of non-interference rather than meddling in Myanmar's internal affairs by intervention." This public commitment to non-interference was reiterated by political analyst, Einar Tangen, who noted that, "it is China's policy not to interfere in the internal affairs of sovereign countries," (R.U. Khaliq, 2021). However, the following economic chaos and the new arising organized pro-democracy groups that aimed to go against the junta, along with the proliferation of scam compounds, greatly displeased Beijing, leading it to spring into action. They approved Operation 1027, an armed offensive by ethnic alliance groups that took control over Laukkaing and put diplomatic pressure on the Myanmar junta to shut down the compounds.

China’s current foreign policy actions, since 2024, have greatly leaned into supporting the military junta. Following Operation 1027, it intervened to compel both the junta and the Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAO) to form a truce in the Northern Shan state and enforced a ‘frozen war’ to protect its borders. In short, we can deem China’s stance to be that of prioritizing stability in a way that would benefit it the most, rather than choosing a side to fully support.

Map: The Irrawaddy (Photo Credit: MNDAA and National Unity Government)

China utilises different levels of engagement. China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council and therefore has the power of veto. In this capacity, it used this to shield the military junta from international sanctions following the 2021 coup, keeping them in power despite the civil unrest in the country. On an international level, it uses its influence to benefit its interests. In 2015, it took on a 70% stake in building the Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, which cost $7.3 billion according to Parker, C. (2023). This gives China geopolitical benefits. It provides them with direct access to the Indian Ocean by connecting the Yunnan province to the Bay of Bengal. Vice Senior General Soe Win, deputy chairman of the junta, has called for its completion despite ongoing local conflicts according to Burma News International Online (2025). On a local level, Beijing engages with EAOs in northern Myanmar, such as the United Wa State Army, in order to influence peace negotiations and to protect Chinese border interests, trading in local stability for border security, representing their eagerness to directly intervene in Myanmar issues to preserve its national interests.

Chinese foreign policy is shaped by economic, security, geopolitical, and bureaucratic drivers that explain its policy towards Myanmar. On top of sourcing most of its rare earth materials from Myanmar, China's most important project is the Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines. The natural gas and oil pipelines connecting Myanmar's Chao Pyu port and Yunnan province were completed. Yunnan was able to develop economically as a petrochemical base in southwest China (Yoshikawa, 2022). It has also invested $15 million in the China-Myanmar economic corridor, which makes it at stake when it comes to Myanmar’s stability.

In terms of China’s security drivers, political stability in Myanmar is necessary for China's security. Any armed conflict in the China-Myanmar border regions is detrimental to China's border security and stability (Myoe, 2015).

Geopolitically, Myanmar is the only country sharing a border with China that also has access to the Indian Ocean. The Kyaukphyu port provides China with direct access to the Indian Ocean, reducing reliance on the Malacca Strait, through which 80% of China's oil imports pass. China also seeks to counter U.S. and Indian influence in Southeast Asia.

Discussing its bureaucratic drivers, China’s actions merely reflect the different actors’ interests. “BRI-related plans need to be understood in combination with political processes that have multiple – and often conflicting – roots and aims, variously originating in Beijing, Kunming, Naypyidaw, and multiple localities on the China–Myanmar borderlands.” Infrastructure projects are entangled with variegated forms of governance and claims to sovereignty (Karin Dean et al., 2022). Beijing prioritizes strategic objectives like access to the Indian Ocean and protecting investment, however, provincial authorities in Yunnan prioritize local development and trade across the border. Despite being fragmented, this puts China in a positive position as it allows them to engage with actors of both sides.

It is further contested whether the impact of China on Myanmar has been for the upholding of peace or for the self-interest of China. For Beijing, its role in the conflict is simply that of peacekeeping and stabilizing borders by taking on a mediation role through brokering peace talks. In January of 2024, it brokered a ceasefire, the Haigeng Agreement, between the junta and the Three Brotherhood Alliance, which aimed to end the clash in the Northern Shan State after Operation 1027, suggesting that its greatest aim is that of general stability in the nation. For China, securing its interests in a volatile political context and ensuring stability in its neighbourhood takes precedence over promoting authoritarianism. China did not appear to have pursued an intentional policy to promote autocracy or counter the democratic process in Myanmar (Saba, A., & Akbarzadeh, S., 2025). Furthermore, by continuing to broker peace agreements between key actors, the likelihood of a state collapse would be significantly reduced as the conditions allow for negotiation rather than immediate war.

However, some argue that China’s foreign policies toward Myanmar have actually done the contrary. Some critics argue that a major factor in the initial success of Operation 1027 was because of China’s support for the Brotherhood Alliance. Speculation exists regarding China’s awareness, support, and encouragement for these operations, and some suspect that China may have tacitly approved the actions of the Three Brotherhood Alliance or even incentivized them to do so (Tang C., 2025).

When the offensive threatened to overthrow the junta, China decided to intervene and delivered weapons to the junta. As soon as it became apparent that the junta could be toppled, they reactively chose to correct the course and give more power to the junta, creating a ‘frozen war’. Additionally, the Chinese side has blocked borders, particularly by banning the entry of fuel and medicine into the Ta'ang region, where the Ta'ang National Liberation Army or ,TNLA, is based (Tang C., 2025). This has created even deeper divisions in the nation, contrary to China’s official framing of the conflict.

Chinese foreign policy on Myanmar shows the issues that come with rising powers in diplomacy. Officially, China presents itself as being committed to its non-interference policy, although in reality, it has played a very significant role in shaping this conflict through intervention on a global, international, and local level. This shows how normative principles are actually flexible when it comes to upholding interests. On a more global level, this implies that China is trying to reshape the liberal order through intervention, enabling more regimes to pivot further from the norm of attempting to achieve objectives such as protecting liberal democracy and upholding human rights, leading to more focus on economic and political stability.

Bibliography

Myoe, M.A., 2015. Myanmar's China policy since 2011: determinants and directions. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs, 34(2), pp.21-54.

Yoshikawa, S., 2022. China's policy towards Myanmar: Yunnan’s commitment to Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines and Border Economic Cooperation Zone. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies.

Ding, S. (2010). Analyzing Rising Power from the Perspective of Soft Power: a new look at China's rise to the status quo power. Journal of Contemporary China. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670560903444207.

Saba, A., & Akbarzadeh, S., 2025. Promoting Authoritarianism? Continuity and Change in China’s Policy Towards Myanmar (1990–2023). Journal of Contemporary China. https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2024.2449057.

Tang, C., 2025. Evaluating Interdependence: The Impacts of the February 2021 Coup on Myanmar–China Relations. Journal of Current Southeast Asian Affairs. https://doi.org/10.1177/18681034251328012.

Yoshikawa, S., 2022. China's policy towards Myanmar: Yunnan’s commitment to Sino-Myanmar oil and gas pipelines and Border Economic Cooperation Zone. Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies. https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2022.2062857.

Dean, K., Sarma, J., & Rippa, A., 2022. Infrastructures and b/ordering: how Chinese projects are ordering China–Myanmar border spaces. Territory, Politics, Governance. https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2022.2108892.

 Khaliq, R.U. (2021) 'China to support ASEAN mediation on Myanmar crisis', Anadolu Agency, 1 April. Available at: https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/china-to-support-asean-mediation-on-myanmar-crisis/2195715

Parker, C. (2023) 'Why is Myanmar’s new deep-sea port such hot property?', The Interpreter, Lowy Institute, 22 November. Available at: https://www.lowyinstitute.org/the-interpreter/why-myanmar-s-new-deep-sea-port-such-hot-property

BNI Online (2025) 'Vice Senior General Soe Win Calls for Effective Execution of Chinese-Supported SEZ Deep-Sea Port in Kyaukphyu Amid Continued Intense Combat', Burma News International, 14 March. Available at: https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/vice-senior-general-soe-win-calls-effective-execution-chinese-supported-sez-deep-sea-port