European Armaments as a Policy of Deterrence

At the 2025 NATO Summit in The Hague, member states declared their intention to spend 5% of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) annually on core defence and security-related spending by 2035. This is a huge and much-needed improvement compared to the previously declared 2% that was pledged by the allies in 2014. 

What factors have led to this decision, and why has it happened so suddenly, when just a year earlier only 18 out of 32 member states were meeting their previous target? Are leaders recognizing a growing threat? Or is this perhaps an indicator of NATO’s preparation for war with Russia? These are some of the questions that this article will aim to answer.

The year 2025 turned out to be a milestone year for the NATO alliance, as it was the first year in which most member states reached the agreed-upon 2% target for military spending. This is especially striking when compared to the fact that, in 2023, only 10 countries had reached this goal. This change in policy may be linked to many factors, but two seem to be the most apparent.

Number of Allies meeting 2% (Photo Credit: Defense Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014-2025).)

Russia’s Hanging Threat on Europe

First and foremost, the Russo-Ukrainian war has made the threat to European security increasingly obvious in the European political sphere, clearly exposing Russia’s imperialist tendencies and the brutality and immorality with which Russian invaders occupy Ukrainian territory.

The ideological differences between Russian society and the representatives of other European countries appear not only evident, but also striking. Russian imperialism is not a new phenomenon; rather, it is deeply embedded in Russian culture, forming a foundational component of its national identity and serving as a principal driver of many political actions undertaken by the Russian state. An illustrative example is the war in South Ossetia and the invasion of Georgia carried out by Russia in 2008.

Despite the longstanding and relatively consistent nature of Russian intentions, it was only after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine that many European political leaders appeared to fully recognise the extent of the threat posed by Russia—not only to Ukrainian sovereignty, but also to the sovereignty of other European states, particularly those bordering Russia. It is important to note that this threat is not merely speculative but very real. It is directly reflected in the public statements of Russian political figures, many of whom have openly spoken about attacking other European states, as well as in Russia’s military actions.

For example, on April 15th, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR) Director Sergey Naryshkin stated: “They should understand, but do not yet understand, that in the event of aggression by the North Atlantic Alliance against (Russia and Belarus), damage will be done, of course, to the entire NATO bloc, but to a greater extent, the first to suffer will be the bearers of such ideas among the political circles of Poland and the Baltic countries.”

In recent years, Russia has conducted multiple acts of sabotage across the European Union. Arson, attacks on railway and transportation infrastructure, energy infrastructure, cyberattacks, and waves of hoax bomb threats are just some of the tactics it has used in its hybrid warfare. Even before that, there were the killings of Alexander Litvinenko and the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal. 

In late November, the French army chief caused considerable outrage by warning the general public about the Russian threat when he said:

“What we are lacking — and this is where you [the mayors] have a role to play — is the spirit. The spirit which accepts that we will have to suffer if we are to protect what we are.

If our country wavers because it is not ready to lose its children … or to suffer economically because the priority has to be military production, then we are indeed at risk.”

As harsh as these words are, they offer a realistic assessment of the potential consequences of a possible conflict.

Trump’s policies in regards to Europe

Another aspect that may generate concern and mobilization within NATO is the gradual loss of confidence in the policies pursued by the US under President Trump, particularly following his remarks in North Carolina in 2024. While addressing his supporters, he stated that he would not support a country that failed to fulfill the obligation of allocating 2 percent of its GDP to defense spending. Furthermore, Trump said that he would encourage Russia to attack such a state. One might believe that this statement was merely intended to pressure countries that had not yet fulfilled the requirement, and although it did ultimately serve that purpose, it is very unlikely that Trump did not fully stand behind his words, especially considering the current relations between Russia and the US.

The deep belief that the USA would act as a helping hand in the event of an attack on Europe has been present in the minds of Europeans for many decades and is perhaps rooted in the historical tradition of American forces intervening in both the First and the Second World Wars. That conviction may have contributed to the neglect of the growing Russian threat, and although the 2014 Russian annexation of Crimea raised some concern in Europe, most countries ignored the dangers and were too quick to forget the unjustified and unlawful invasion of Ukraine. 

Europe’s unwavering confidence in American support in the face of a threat was quickly destroyed by Trump’s isolationist policies. The current President of the United States has repeatedly emphasized his belief that Europe should be more independent in matters of defense and armaments. The clearest evidence of this is the National Security Strategy of the United States of America published by the White House in December 2025, in which the President states that “enabling Europe to stand on its own feet and operate as a group of aligned sovereign nations, including by taking primary responsibility for its own defense” is one of the main goals of the USA’s policy regarding Europe.

Moreover, the presidential goals also include “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations,” which should be a real cause for concern, especially in light of the supposed leaked extended version of the USA’s national strategy, in which Austria, Hungary, Italy, and Poland are identified as countries the U.S. should “work more with … with the goal of pulling them away from the [European Union].”

It should therefore not come as a surprise that the United States—once regarded as Poland’s key ally and treated as such in international policy—is no longer perceived as positively as it was in the past, despite expressions of support from segments of the far right. A survey conducted by the newspaper „Rzeczpospolita” indicates that fewer than 30 percent of Poles responded affirmatively to the question, “Do you consider today’s United States to be a reliable ally of Poland?” In contrast, as many as 53.2 percent expressed the view that the United States is not a reliable ally. This climate of opinion seems to be growing within the EU, and Trump’s more recent actions, such as violating the "Turnberry Agreement" signed by the EU and the United States this summer, only serve to reinforce these sentiments.

Another factor that may be perceived as undermining the credibility of the United States is the declining level of support provided to Ukraine. One indication of this trend is that, on the fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a resolution reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of Ukraine. However, the resolution was not supported by the United States, which abstained from voting on the measure expressing support for Ukraine.

Trump also repeatedly emphasized the alleged lack of gratitude on the part of Ukraine for the assistance it has received, which was particularly visible in the conversations between Volodymyr Zelenskyy and the President of the United States that took place a year ago in February.

The fact that the Ukrainian president has repeatedly expressed gratitude not only toward the USA but also toward other countries providing assistance to Ukraine should be, and is, obvious. It is, however, worth noting how rarely the rest of Europe, together with its allies, expresses gratitude toward Ukraine, which is currently resisting the Russian aggressor and thereby defending the sovereignty and security of other European countries and their citizens. 

A deep conviction about the need to express gratitude, and accusations of its absence, constitute a frequently recurring political tactic of Trump, suggesting that he considers America and its citizens to be a superior nation in comparison to others. This thesis also finds confirmation in the current domestic policy pursued by the head of state. Likewise, repeated accusations of a lack of gratitude can be observed in his statements at the World Economic Forum. On January 21st, in his speech, he responded to a speech delivered a day earlier by the Canadian Prime Minister, Mark Carney, who had urged states to publicly oppose President Donald Trump’s foreign policy. At the beginning of his address, Donald Trump said: “Canada gets a lot of freebies from us, by the way. They should be grateful, but they are not.” Later in the speech, referring to the people of Denmark, he added: “But how ungrateful are they now?” This part of the speech concerned U.S. protection of Greenland and the claim that the USA “gave Greenland back — how stupid were we to do that?”

This clearly demonstrates the mercantilist outlook attributed to Donald Trump and the fact that he does not appear to believe in altruistic principles or selfless assistance. While it is evident that few, if any, decisions in international relations are based solely on goodwill, one might reasonably expect support from an ally without the anticipation of further repayment, particularly when such assistance is later used as grounds for reproach decades afterward. Especially considering the fact that the US was also provided with military assistance by its allies, for example in the war in Afghanistan. In January, Donald Trump claimed that NATO troops "stayed a little back, a little off the front lines" which was an obvious lie, causing outrage not only among veterans and the families of the fallen, but also across the political establishments of countries that had provided assistance to the US.

The resistance of NATO’S policies

The fact that Eastern European countries rely on and value NATO the most should not come as a surprise, as for them collective security is the main, if not the only, source of hope in the event of a possible invasion. Russia’s current actions, as well as their long history of imperialism, which stretches back well before the twentieth century, have certainly contributed to their legitimate and just concerns.

The situation differs significantly in Western Europe. While Western European countries have also been negatively affected by Russian influence in the past, their citizens do not seem to be as frightened by the growing threat Russia now poses to Europe as are the citizens of countries bordering Russia. Although this difference is understandable and, in one sense, obvious, it is now more necessary than ever for Western European countries to recognize that Russia poses a serious threat not only to bordering states—which alone should justify increased military spending, given that NATO and European Union membership entails mutual defense obligations—but also to Europe as a whole and to European unity. A strong and united Europe is perceived as adversarial not only by Russia but, increasingly, also by the United States.

"Anti-war" strikes in Madrid, (Photo Credit: BBC.com)

The 2025 decision to increase defense spending to 5% of GDP has caused significant outrage in several Western European countries, including Germany, Spain, the Netherlands, Italy, and Slovenia.

After endorsing NATO’s new target for defense and security spending, Slovenian Prime Minister Robert Golob faced political backlash at home. Coalition tensions led to plans for a referendum on higher defense spending, while Golob countered by proposing a separate referendum on Slovenia’s continued membership in NATO. Public protests, particularly in Ljubljana, opposed the increased military expenditure. Ultimately, the National Assembly of Slovenia voted to cancel both referendum initiatives, easing the immediate political crisis.

In Spain, previously the lowest-spending NATO ally, strikes erupted in Madrid, drawing thousands into an “anti-war protest.” 

Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez called the decision “unreasonable” and stated that it was “incompatible with our worldview.”

Defence expenditure as a share of GDP (Photo Credit: NATO Secretary General's Annual Report 2024.)

Answering the question posed in the first paragraphs, it must be stated unequivocally that in the current geopolitical situation, the policy of defense spending is not aimed at preparing for future aggression, but rather at implementing a policy of deterrence.  A united and militarily strong Europe can ensure the safety and peace of its citizens, as well as exert a positive  influence on global politics.

Bibliography

NATO, Defence expenditures and NATO’s 5% commitment. Available at: https://www.nato.int/en/what-we-do/introduction-to-nato/defence-expenditures-and-natos-5-commitment (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

NATO,  Defence Expenditure of NATO Countries (2014–2025). Available at: https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/webready/documents/finance/def-exp-2025-en.pdf (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

NATO (2025b) Secretary General’s Annual Report 2024. Available at: https://www.nato.int/content/dam/nato/legacy-wcm/media_pdf/2025/4/pdf/sgar24-en.pdf (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

BBC News (2026a) Outcry at army chief's warning France must prepare to 'lose children' in war. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce91zvnrz0lo (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

The Kyiv Independent, Abbey Fenbert First to suffer: Russia singles out Poland, Baltics in threat to NATO. Available at: https://kyivindependent.com/first-to-suffer-russia-singles-out-poland-baltics-in-threat-to-nato/ (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

YouTube, CBC News, Trump says he would 'encourage' Russia to attack NATO allies who don't spend enough on defence. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lu0Ki8eD5lk (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

Defense One (2025) Make Europe Great Again and a longer version of the national security strategy. Available at: https://www.defenseone.com/policy/2025/12/make-europe-great-again-and-more-longer-version-national-security-strategy/410038/ (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

Rzeczpospolita Sondaż: Czy USA są wiarygodnym sojusznikiem Polski? Znamy zdanie Polaków. Available at: https://www.rp.pl/dyplomacja/art43734241-sondaz-czy-usa-sa-wiarygodnym-sojusznikiem-polski-znamy-zdanie-polakow (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

United Nations News (2026) LIVE: UN marks fourth anniversary of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Available at: https://news.un.org/en/story/2026/02/1167022 (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

YouTube, Al Arabiya English, Trump: ‘Ungrateful Canada Gets Lots of Freebies from US’. Available at: https://youtube.com/shorts/j0-7seXvGnE (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

YouTube, BrutAmerica, Trump calls people of Denmark "ungrateful.". Available at: https://youtube.com/shorts/qDswqxpuTZY (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

Democracy Now! (2025) Protesters reject NATO’s call to vastly boost military spending. Available at: https://www.democracynow.org/2025/6/25/headlines/protesters_reject_natos_call_to_vastly_boost_military_spending (Accessed: 28 February 2026).

Politico (2026) Slovenia’s NATO gamble: Robert Golob and EU politics. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/slovenia-nato-gamble-robert-golob-politics-eu/(Accessed: 28 February 2026).

BBC News (2026b), Why Trump is targeting Spain over Nato spending. Available at: https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ckg3082d3ero (Accessed: 28 February 2026).